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Please find attached a letter sent by Ambassador van Agt to 
Congressman Levin on EC and US positions on Services in the 
Uruguay Round. This letter succinctly summarises the EC 
position. 
Separately, as mentioned during the Commercial Counsellors 
meeting, I can confirm that bilateral negotiations with the US on 
initial commitments in sevices will go ahead with the US on 24/25 
Janaury in Geneva. 
V v3?, 
Andreas van Agt 
E DELEGATION OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
The Honorable 
Sander M. Levin 
U.S. House of Representatives 
323 Cannon Building 
Washington, D.C. 20515 
14 January, 1991 
I enjoyed meeting you at the seminar on the Uruguay Round 
hosted by the Institute of International Economics on 18 December 
1990 and although we approach matters from a different 
perspective I found your remarks of considerable interest. I 
would like however to set the record straight on the respective 
positions of the EC and the US on the services negotiations in 
the Round since there are substantive differences between us 
(and indeed between the US and virtually all other participants 
in the negotiations) on this issue. 
To begin on where we agree the EC shares with the US the 
need to get a services agreement encompassing a framework of 
rules and disciplines, sectoral annexes which deal with the 
peculiarities of those sectors, including some derogations for 
speciZic sub-sectors where these are unavoidable, and meaningful 
initial liberalisation commitments. The principal differences 
relate to the approach taken by the US towards applying the 
results of the negotiation on a most favoured nation basis and 
the scale and duration of derogations from the "mfn" principle 
for certain sectors. 
Prior to the Brussels Ministerial Conference the US had 
made a direct link between the granting of mfn in the framework 
and initial commitments. This linkage was rejected out of hand 
by all the other participants in the negotiations. Why? Because 
the US approach was tantamount to imposing a mirror-image 
reciprocal approach to the negotiations destined to encourage the 
use of unilateral tools of US trade policy and thus hinder rather 
than facilitate the liberalisation of services markets. 
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In Brussels the US modified its position somewhat but more 
in terms of presentation than substance. The US approach is now 
to tie the acceptance of mfn to a political commitment on the 
outcome of negotiations on'initial commitments. Acceptance of 
mfn as a working hypothesis - the US approach - is not the same 
thing as giving an up-front unconditional commitment to mfn and 
then negotiating limited sectoral derogations where necessary 
plus a package of liberalisation commitments before assessing 
whether the package as a whole is acceptable. The latter 
approach, which is that of the EC and of most other countries, 
addresses the "free rider" problem which all developed countries 
are concerned about but does not hold the mfn principle as 
hostage to reciprocal liberalisation commitments by sector. 
We should be absolutely clear on this: an agreement which does 
not give mfn as a right to all parties is no genuine multilateral 
agreement. 
A second and equally important difference between the EC 
and the US concerns mfn derogations for certain sectors. The US 
is demanding nothing less than a total mfn derogation for the air 
and maritime transport sectors. The EC does see the need for 
some derogations on mfn in the transport sector - including air 
and maritime - but these should be limited to specific activities 
where this is strictly necessary, be linked to international 
obligations and be degressive, the aim being ultimately the full 
incorporation of these sectors. in the agreement. The US has so 
far not accepted this principle of degressivity in these 
negotiations thereby setting itself apart from its trading 
partners. 
Other EC-US differences are in the area of basic 
telecommunications services - where the US has predicated its 
willingness to give mfn in basic telecommunications on a 
readiness by other developed countries to make commitments now to 
eliminate their monopolies in this area, a demand which is 
patently non-negotiable, particularly as substantial portions of 
basic telecommunications in the US remain subject to effective 
monopoly. Finally, the EC, with the support of virtually all 
other participants, is seeking a limited derogation on cultural 
grounds for audiovisual services; this is contested by the US. 
The upshot of all this is that the US - initially the 
champion of liberalisation of services - has become the most 
recalcitrant partner in a number of areas of the services 
negotiations whilst in others pursuing a mirror-image approach to 
market liberalisation based on sectoral reciprocity, in direct 
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contradiction with the original goal of exchanging trade 
concessions on a multilateral basis across the universe of 
service sectors. It is thus very important that in the next few 
weeks the US reflect further on its approach to the services 
negotiations which are a key component of the Uruguay Round as a 
whole. 
Andreas van Agt 
